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Essay 
WARREN BURGER AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
CARL TOBIAS* 
CHIEF Justice Warren E. Burger was President Richard M. Nixon's first nominee to the United States Supreme Court. 
While running as a presidential candidate, Nixon campaigned on a 
promise to appoint jurists who would strictly construe the United 
States Constitution and exercise judicial restraint. By naming War-
ren Burger in 1969, President Nixon intended to honor that pledge 
and hoped to reverse the liberal judicial activism which he asserted 
the Supreme Court had practiced under Chief Justice Earl Warren. 1 
It is a testament to Chief Justice Burger and to the institution 
of the Supreme Court that President Nixon's wish remained essen-
tially unrealized. Indeed, Warren Burger's tenure as Chief Justice is 
replete with ironies. The Court which Warren Burger led moder-
ated a few Warren Court precedents, particularly involving criminal 
law and procedure; however, it left intact, and even consolidated, 
much Warren Court jurisprudence. 
The Burger Court was as activist as its predecessor in recogniz-
ing constitutional rights and actually elaborated certain legal theo-
ries that the Warren Court had only suggested. For example, Chief 
Justice Burger wrote or joined in opinions which declared new 
rights for women, emphasized separation of powers and inter-
preted the First Amendment.2 Perhaps most ironic, the Chief Jus-
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Kathy Monzie,Jeff 
Renz and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions and Cecelia Palmer and Shannan 
Sproull for processing this piece. Errors that remain are mine. 
1. Linda Greenhouse, Warren E. Burger Is Dead at 87: Was Chief justice for 17 
Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1995, at Al (stating that nomination made Chief Justice 
Burger "a lightening rod for those who welcomed as well as those who feared the 
end of an era of judicial activism"); A.E. Dick Howard, He Was Not What They Ex-
pected, NAT'L LJ.,July 10, 1995, at A20 (recalling President Nixon's promise to put 
"political conservatives" and "strict constructionists" on bench); Henry J. Reske, 
The Diverse Legacy of Warren Burger: Law-and-Order Chief Justice Joined in Activist Opin-
ions That Shaped Social Policy, A.BA. J., Aug. 1995, at 36 (asserting that President 
Nixon had campaigned in part against activist record of Warren Court). 
2. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721-27 (1986) (emphasizing sepa-
ration of powers between Legislative, Executive and Judicial Branches); INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (same); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-66 
(1973) (declaring abortion rights for women); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 
(1971) (declaring women's rights); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) 
(505) 
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tice, whom President Nixon appointed in the name of law-and-
order, authored the decision that required President Nixon to di-
vulge the taped White House conversations that ultimately lead to 
his resignation.s 
These and other actions of Warren Burger exasperated individ-
uals who supported his appointment and pleased those who op-
posed it, even as additional activities of the Chief Justice infuriated 
both his proponents and detractors. In the final analysis, Warren 
Burger may have fully satisfied no one, except himself. Soon after 
Warren Burger's 1986 retirement, he characteristically reflected: 
"It's always been somewhat comforting to know ... that I have been 
castigated by so-called liberals for being too conservative and casti-
gated by so-called conservatives for being too liberal. Pretty safe 
position to be in."4 Numerous legal scholars, historians, political 
scientists and pundits have thoroughly evaluated these important 
aspects of the Chief Justice's work.5 
I want to emphasize another dimension of Warren Burger's ca-
reer as Chief Justice which is equally ironic and at least as signifi-
(interpreting First Amendment); see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of 
Educ., 402 U.S. l, 29-31 (1971) (holding busing is legitimate means of achieving 
desegregation). See generally THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT 
WASN'T at vii (Vincent A. Blasi ed., 1983) (arguing that Burger Court enlarged 
reach of earlier decisions of Warren Court on racial equality and First Amend-
ment); THE BURGER YEARS at vii (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987) (considering legal 
impact of Burger Court decisions on "blacks, women, the press, criminal defend-
ants, labor unions, and others"). 
3. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974) (ordering President 
Nixon to divulge material based on principle that President's generalized interest 
in confidentiality must yield to specific need for evidence in pending criminal 
trial). See generally Joan Biskupic, Ex-Chief Justice Warren Burger Dead at Age 87; Court 
Helped Define Major Social Changes, WASH. PosT, June 26, 1995, at Al (reporting 
Nixon decision "was arguably the Burger [C]ourt's most dramatic moment"); 
Reske, supra note l, at 36 (stating President Nixon appointed Burger as law-and-
order Justice). 
4. Biskupic, supra note 3, at Al. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Two Cheers Far 
Warren Burger, 4 CONST. COMM. 1, 1 (1987) (describing response to Chief Justice 
Burger's judicial opinions as unenthusiastic); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Lessons Learned 
From Warren Burger, CONN. L. TRIB.,July 10, 1995, at 27 (stating "conservative true 
believers come to think of Burger as an undependable compromiser more attuned 
to conventional wisdom and public opinion than to conservative principle"). 
5. See, e.g., THE BURGER COURT: THE CouNTER-REvoLUTION THAT WASN'T, 
supra note 2, at xii (presenting series of commentaries by 12 close students of Bur-
ger Court's work); THE BURGER YEARS, supra note 2, at vii (compiling analyses by 
scholars and experts of Burger Court's rulings from both practical and theoretical 
perspectives); Albert W. Alschuler, Fail,ed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 
100 HARV. L. REv. 1436, 1437-41 (1987) (detailing Burger Court's "inconstant per-
formance" and its "reluctance or inability to chart a clear course"); Abram Chayes, 
The Supreme Courl 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Courl, 
96 HARV. L. REv. 4, 7-8 (1982) (describing Burger Court's decisions as "something 
less than hospitable" to procedures and elements of public law litigation). 
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cant. This feature is Warren Burger's enormous contribution to 
improving the administration of Justice in the United States. The 
Chief Justice won justly-deseived credit, realized some of his great-
est successes, and probably left the most lasting legacy in this un-
glamorous, thankless, and yet critical, area. 
Warren Burger was fond of observing that he took seriously the 
title of Chief Justice of the United States, not merely the Supreme 
Court, and considered himself the steward of the whole judicial sys-
tem, state and federal. 6 It is quite ironic that the jurist whom Rich-
ard Nixon hoped would end an era of judicial activism employed 
judicial activism in the service of the administration of justice. 
The plethora of institutions dedicated to enhancing the ad-
ministration of justice established during Warren Burger's tenure 
testifies to his leadership. These entities include the Institute for 
Court Management, the National Institute of Corrections, the Na-
tional College of the Judiciary, the National Center for State 
Courts, the State Justice Institute, the American Inns of Court and 
the Supreme Court Historical Society. 7 
Warren Burger also staunchly supported and actively partici-
pated in the work of similar organizations, such as the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States, the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) and 
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO), which 
6. Greenhouse, supra note 1, at Al; see Dennis J. Hutchinson, A Transitional 
Chief justice With a Contradictory Record, NAT'L LJ.,July 10, 1995, at A20 (describing 
Chief Justice Burger as "the transitional figure between the presiding justice of old 
and the modern judicial administrator"); Thomas]. Moyer, Federalism's Champion, 
NAT'L LJ.,July 17, 1995, at A22 (remembering Justice Burger as Chief Justice who 
made great contributions to state court system); Retired Chief Justice Warren Burger 
Reflects on D'evewpments in the judiciary During His Tenure, 20 THE THIRD BRANCH 
(Fed.Judicial Ctr., Wash., D.C.), Sept. 1988, at l, 5-7 [hereinafter Reflections] (dis-
cussing Chief Justice Burger's involvement with administrative aspect of judicial 
system). 
7. See Warren Cikins, Unexpected Enlightenment: Warren Burger's Law-and-Order 
Legacy Includes a Lesser Known Commitment to Prison Reform, THE REcoRDER,July 11, 
1995, at 8 (attributing establishment of National Institute of Corrections, National 
College of the Judiciary, and State Justice Institute to Chief Justice Burger); Wil-
liam H. Rehnquist, A Tribute to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, 100 HARv. L. REv. 969, 
970 (1987) (stating that existence of aforementioned judicial entities is "testimony 
to Warren Burger's constant concern for health and welfare of state courts"); 
Reske, supra note 1, at 37 (recognizing Chief Justice Burger's influence in creating 
Institute for Court Management, National Center for State Courts, American Inns 
of Courts and Supreme Court Historical Society); Warren Burger Leaves Imprint on 
the judiciary, 27 THE THIRD BRANCH (Fed.Judicial Ctr., Wash., D.C.),July 1995, at l, 
4 [hereinafter Imprint] (crediting Chief Justice Burger with creating number of 
entities dedicated to improvement of justice). See generally Mark W. Cannon, Inno--
vation in the Administration of Justice, 1969-1981: An Overview, in THE POLITICS OF 
JumcIAL REFORM 35, 39-42 (Philip L. Dubois ed., 1982) (chronicling Chief Justice 
Burger's early efforts to facilitate judicial reform). 
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already existed when he became Chief Justice. Warren Burger pre-
sided over thirty-four meetings of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, the principal policymaking arm of the federal 
courts.8 He correspondingly assumed major responsibility for con-
verting the nascent, rather obscure Federal Judicial Center, whose 
board the Chief Justice chairs by statute, into an influential entity 
for research and writing on the Third Branch.9 
Warren Burger's perceptive appreciation of the need to en-
courage, increase and institutionalize dialogue between federal and 
state judges concomitantly led him to promote the creation of 
State-Federal Judicial Councils. Io Practically every one of the above 
organizations was established to improve the performance of all in-
dividuals-including judicial officers, as well as clerks of court, pro-
bation officials and marshals-who deliver federal and state civil 
and criminal justice. I I 
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994) (explaining Judicial Conference of the United 
States and Chief Justice's leading role); Imprint, supra note 7, at 4 (stating that 
Judicial Conference adopted resolution to formally honor Chief Justice Burger). 
For a further discussion of the Judicial Conference resolution, see infra note 52 
and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the Judicial Conference, see 
generally RussELL R. WHEELER & GoRDoN BERMANT, FEDERAL CouRT GoVERNANCE: 
WHY CONGRESS SHOULD-AND WHY CONGRESS SHOULD NOT-CREATE A FULL-TIME 
ExECUTIVEJUDGE, ABousH THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, AND REMOVE CIRCUIT JUDGES 
FROM DISTRICT COURT GoVERNANCE 13-15 (1994). 
9. See28 U.S.C. § 62l(a)(l) (1994) ("[T]he Chief Justice of the United States 
... shall be the permanent Chairman of the Board"); Greenhouse, supra note 1, at 
Al (stating that Chief Justice Burger contributed much effort to organizations 
whose purpose was to improve judicial process); see also Imprint, supra note 7, at 4 
(suggesting Chief Justice Burger was strong supporter of Administrative Office of 
the United States (AO)). See generally William W Schwarzer, The Federal judicial 
Center and the Administration of justice in the Federal Courts, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 
1129, 1130 (1995) (stating that Federal Judicial Center has greatly contributed to 
improved judicial administration); Russell R. Wheeler, Empirical Research and the 
Politics of judicial Administration: Creating the Federal judicial Center, LAw & CONTEMP. 
PROSS., Summer 1988, at 31 (discussing evolution of judicial administration). 
10. See Warren E. Burger, The Annual Report on the State of Justice, Address 
Before ABA, St. Louis, Mo. (Aug. 10, 1970), in WARREN E. BURGER, DELIVERY OF 
JusncE 44 (1990) (urging creation of State-Federal Judicial Council to maintain 
"continuing communication on all joint problems"); Imprint, supra note 7, at 4 
(recalling Justice Burger's commitment to strengthen relationship between state 
and federal judges). For a further discussion of State-Federal Judicial Councils, see 
Reflections, supra note 6, at 5. For a general discussion of state and federal judicial 
relationships, see generally National Conference on State-Federal judicial Relationships, 
78 VA. L. REv. 1655, 1655 (1992) (reproducing papers and commentary from Na-
tional Conference on State-Federal Judicial Relationships held in April 1992); 
Moyer, supra note 6, at A22 (stating that Chief Justice Burger "did more to elevate 
the status of the state courts in our system of federalism than did anyone before 
him"). 
11. See Imprint, supra note 7, at 1, 4 (remarking that Chief Justice Burger's 
impact was felt by courts at all levels); Greenhouse, supra note 1, at Al ("[Chief 
Justice Burger] believed that judges could be helped to be more efficient if profes-
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The creation of the many entities that I have examined and the 
legislative receptivity to numerous additional initiatives that the 
Chief Justice supported, attest to his facility in working with Con-
gress. For instance, Warren Burger was an avid proponent of court 
administrators, and he successfully advocated for the establishment 
of the office of circuit executive.12 Moreover, when the Chief Jus-
tice perceived that district courts were encountering growing 
docket pressures, he convinced Senators and Representatives to ex-
pand the jurisdiction of magistrate judges. 13 Warren Burger corre-
spondingly persuaded Congress to create the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to capitalize on the efficiencies 
that specialized courts can yield and to reduce somewhat the work-
loads of judges on the regional appellate courts. 14 
The Chief Justice also convinced Senators and Representatives 
that they must devote additional resources to the Third Branch. 
For example, between the time of his 1969 appointment and 1980, 
Congress doubled the number of active federal judges and appro-
priated a five-fold increase in the federal courts' budget.15 Warren 
sional management techniques were imported to the courts, from clerk's offices to 
judges' chambers."). 
12. See Act of Jan. 5, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-647, 84 Stat. 1907 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 332(f) (1994)) (providing for appointment of circuit exec-
utive for each judicial circuit); Rehnquist, supra note 7, at 970 (referring to Justice 
Burger as one of "principal architects of the idea of circuit executives"). See gener-
ally BURGER, DELIVERY OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 32-35 (reproducing speech ti-
tled "Court Administrators: Where Would We Find Them?," ABA, Dallas, Tex., 
Aug. 12, 1969). For a further discussion of circuit executives, see JOHN T. McDER-
MOTT & STEVEN FLANDERS, THE IMPACT OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE ACT 7-31 (1979); 
JOHN W. MAcv,JR., THE FIRST DECADE OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE ACT: AN EVALUA-
TION (1985); Reflections, supra note 6, at 1, 5. 
13. See Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1994)) (stating purpose is to "improve judicial 
machinery by further defining the jurisdiction of United States magistrates"); see 
also James A. Gazell, Chief Justice Burger's Quest for Judicial Administrative Efficiency, 
1977 DET. C.L. REv. 456, 465 (detailing rising caseloads and Chief Justice Burger's 
efforts to treat them at all levels of federal court system). For a further discussion 
offederal magistrates, see generally CARROLL SERON, THE ROLES OF l\1AGISTRATES IN 
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1983). 
14. See Act of Apr. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994)) (establishing United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit). See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A 
Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1989) (arguing tiiat Court of 
Appeals for Federal Circuit has been unable to attain fully efficient objectives that 
specialization can accomplish); United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
Tenth Anniversary Commemorative Issue, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 559-1074 (1992). For a 
further discussion of Chief Justice Burger's efforts to reduce workload on federal 
circuit courts, see infra notes 27-31, 44-45 and accompanying text. 
15. See Warren E. Burger, How Can We Cope? The Constitution After 200 Years, 
65 A.BAJ. 203, 206 (1979) (asserting that judiciary doubled in size); see also Act of 
Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § l(a), 92 Stat. 1629 (authorizing additional 
510 VILIANOVA LAw REVIEW [Vol. 41: p. 505 
Burger persuaded Senators and Representatives as well to authorize 
the position of Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice in rec-
ognition of the administrative demands that are imposed on the 
office.16 Furthermore~ Warren Burger supported the establishment 
of the Judicial Fellows program, which enables scholars to engage 
in challenging work for a year at the Supreme Court, the FJC or the 
A0.17 
The Chief Justice, in his role as head of the judiciary, ardently 
and persistently promoted initiatives that were intended to facilitate 
effective court management and to foster efficiency. Congress 
sponsored most of these endeavors, but others proceeded primarily 
within the Third Branch. For instance, Warren Burger enjoyed sub-
stantial success in modernizing courts by advocating the application 
of technological innovations, such as increased computerization 
and streamlined docketing. 1s 
judgeships). Compare JUDICIAL CoNF. OF THE UNITED STATES ANN. REP. 82 (1970) 
(providing $155,621,000 estimated annual budget figure) withJumcIAL CONF. OF 
THE UNITED STATES ANN. REP. (1980) (providing $668,000,000 annual budget fig-
ure). See generally Biskupic, supra note 3, at 1 (reporting Chief Justice Burger's 
efforts to raise judges' pay). 
16. See Act of Mar. l, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-238, § l, 86 Stat. 46 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 677 (1994)) (authorizing Chief Justice to appoint Admin-
istrative Assistant). See generally Gazell, supra note 13, at 466-67 (listing managerial 
duties of Administrative Assistant to Chief Justice); Philip B. Kurland, Mr. Chief 
Justice Burger on the State of the Judiciary - 1981, 15 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1105, 1109 
(1981) (reporting recent creation of office of Administrative Assistant). Warren 
Burger's concern about ethics led him to support passage of the Judicial Conduct 
and Disability Act. See Act of Oct. 15, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1994)) (establishing procedure for process-
ing complaints against federal judges). For additional discussion of Warren 
Burger's work with Congress, see Cikins, supra note 7, at 8; Leon Friedman, The 
Community's Protector, 72 A.B.A.J. 14, 14 (1986); Hutchinson, supra note 6, at A20. 
17. See RUSSELL R. WHEELER & HOWARD R. WHITCOMB, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRA-
TION: TEXT AND READINGS at xiv (1977) (stating that idea for book on judicial 
administration was developed during authors' participation in Judicial Fellows pro-
gram created by Chief Justice Burger); Imprint, supra note 7, at 4 (explaining that 
Chief Justice Burger supported creation of Judicial Fellows program on recom-
mendation of his assistant, Mark W. Cannon). See generally Gazell, supra note 13, at 
467 (reciting Justice Burger's hope that Judicial Fellows would later make further 
contributions to development of judicial administration). 
18. See Imprint, supra note 7, at 1 (relating Chief Justice Burger's efforts to 
increase court efficiency through improved technology and streamlined docket-
ing); Mark W. Cannon, Creative Administrator, NAT'L LJ.,July 17, 1995, atA22 (sug-
gesting that Chief Justice Burger contributed more than did any of his 
predecessors in modernizing administration of justice); Reske, supra note l, at 37 
(stating that Chief justice Burger modernized not only Supreme Court and federal 
courts, but state courts as well). See generally Cannon, supra note 7, at 40-41 
(describing Chief Justice Burger's efforts to modernize both federal and state 
courts). For a further discussion of Chief Justice Burger's efforts to modernize the 
judiciary, see R.ejlections, supra note 6, at 1, 5. 
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Warren Burger's indefatigable efforts to enhance the quality of 
courts' operations led him to encourage a broad spectrum of stud-
ies relating to the courts. One prominent example was the Chief 
Justice's orchestration of the Pound Conference, a 1976 conclave 
which intensively evaluated perceived problems of the civil justice 
system, such as the litigation explosion and abuse of the discovery 
process.19 
During the Pound Conference, Chief Justice Burger delivered 
the keynote address, titled Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for System-
atic Anticipation,20 that typified the topics which the meeting's at-
tendees explored. The Chief Justice's presentation, those of other 
participants and exchanges during the session addressed the issues 
that were considered critical to civil dispute resolution at the time 
and anticipated many questions which have figured prominently in 
ensuing debate. Several students of federal civil procedure and the 
federal courts credit this convocation with initiating a constructive 
national conversation on civil justice that continues unabated.21 
The Pound Conference may even have represented a water-
shed for modem federal civil procedure. Since 1938, when the 
Supreme Court adopted the original Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, the Court and Judicial Conference Committees, which devel-
oped recommendations for the Rules' improvement, maintained a 
national, uniform code of procedure, while judges had flexibly and 
pragmatically applied the Rules.22 During the mid-1970s, a number 
19. See THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 5-6 
(A. Leo Levin & Russell Wheeler eds., 1979) (documenting proceedings of Na-
tional Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administra-
tion of Justice, jointly sponsored by Judicial Conference of United States, 
Conference of Chief Justices and American Bar Association). 
20. See id. at 23 (questioning whether judicial system can meet demands of 
future, as well as exploring possibilities of change). 
21. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Con-
struct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 659, 
712 (1993) (suggesting new rules proposed and adopted during past decade re-
flect efforts of Chief Justice Burger); Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure 
While You Watch It Disintegrate, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1155, 1156-59 (1993) (detailing 
concerns raised at Pound Conference). For a further discussion of examples of 
the continuing national conversation regarding civil justice, see infra notes 37-45 
and accompanying text. See generally Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Fedr 
eralRul,es of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 270, 288 & n.122 (1989) (discussing 
differing sides of debate on implications of increase in civil litigation). 
22. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal 
Rul,es of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 910 (1987) 
(stating that 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were heralded as phenomenal 
success and worked effectively for three decades); Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 
and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1589, 1591-93 (1994) (stating 
that drafters sought to enhance uniformity by requiring that all federal district 
courts apply same procedures);Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rul,es 
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of judges and writers began re-evaluating this procedural model, 
and some observers suggested that it be narrowed.23 
Considerable change subsequently materialized and assumed 
several forms. Particularly important were the rise of managerial 
judging, whereby district judges exercised greater control over liti-
gation's pretrial phase, and the closely-related phenomenon of pro-
liferating local procedures, many of which conflicted with 
applicable Federal Rules.24 Equally significant were the Supreme 
Court's promulgation and judicial enforcement of the 1983 Federal 
Rules Amendments,25 relating to sanctions, pretrial conferences 
of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1901, 
1906 (1989) (describing authors of Federal Rules as seeking "horizontal national 
uniformity, broader judicial discretion, and the fusion of law and equity" by 
promulgating Federal Rules). See generally Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and 
Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 761, 783 (1993) 
(describing Rules as "revolutionary" in nature). 
23. SeeSubrin, supra note 21, at 1158 (describing "sea change" of 1970s when 
courts started requiring specific pleading for certain types of cases and sought to 
control and limit discovery). Of course, numerous participants in the Pound Con-
ference suggested that expansive procedure be limited. For a further discussion of 
the Pound Conference, see supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. See also 
Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 995, 998-1000 (1980) 
(Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that original discovery rules lead to delay and ex-
cessive expense and are in need of reform); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: 
Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1, 8 (1984) ("The liberal and permissive Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure ... may be contributing to the protraction of cases in 
today's era of complex regulation and behemoth disputes."). 
24. For analysis of managerial judging, see generally STEVEN FLANDERS, CASE 
MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT JN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1977); 
Robert F. Peckham, The Federal judge as a Case Manager: The New Rnk in Guiding a 
Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REv. 770, 770 (1981) (suggesting that more 
effective use by judges of pretrial management procedures led to rise in judicial 
efficiency);Judith Resnik, Managerial judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374, 377 (1982) (ob-
serving that, as result of rise in managerial judging, judges play critical role in 
shaping litigation and influencing results). For analysis of local procedural 
proliferation, see COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT: LOCAL RULES ON 
CIVIL PRACTICE (1989) (examining local rules of various districts); Stephen N. Sub-
rin, Federal Ruks, Local Ruks, and State Ruks: Uniformity, Divergence and Emergi,ng 
Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999, 2018 (1989) (including as reasons for 
local rule proliferation: increase in number and complexity of federal cases, ex-
plosion in discovery and documentation, and desire by federal judges to manage 
their dockets and routinize operations); Tobias, supra note 22, at 1595-98 (discuss-
ing problems associated with local procedural proliferation). 'Judges often pur-
sued managerial judging, especially prior to the 1983 Federal Rules amendments, 
by issuing local procedures." Tobias, supra note 22, at 1595. 
25. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1095 
(1983) (amending Rules 7, 11, 16, 26, 52, 53, 67, 72, 73, 74, 75 and 76). See gener-
ally ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSI-
BILITY 10-11 (1984) (attempting to alter pretrial process by increasing lawyer re-
sponsibility, improving judicial oversight, changing rules of discovery and 
imposing sanctions). The 1983 amendments legitimated and codified numerous 
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and discovery, and the passage and implementation of the Civil Jus-
tice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA).26 In short, issues ventilated dur-
ing, and at the time of, the Pound Conference struck responsive 
chords and have continued to resonate. 
Warren Burger also played an instrumental role in creating the 
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, 
popularly known as the Hruska Commission.27 When the Chief Jus-
tice recognized that a "crisis of volume" might threaten justice in 
the federal circuits, he urged that this entity be established to un-
dertake a comprehensive evaluation of the appeals courts and to 
propose improvements.2s 
Congress implemented the Commission's recommendation 
that the former Fifth Circuit be divided in 1980,29 while the Com-
practices that district judges pursued under the rubric of managerial judging. See 
Tobias, supra note 22, at 1594-95 (arguing that amendments compromised idea of 
uniform national procedure code). 
26. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994)) (identifying, developing and 
implementing solutions to problems of cost and delay in civil litigation). The Civil 
Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA) implicitly encouraged all 94 federal districts to 
experiment with expense and delay reduction procedures which conflicted with 
applicable Federal Rules. Numerous districts accepted that invitation. See Tobias, 
supra note 22, at 1601-04, 1617-27 (discussing implementation of CJRA). For a 
discussion of the effects of implementing the CJRA, see infra notes 39-40 and ac-
companying text. See generally Patrick Johnston, Civil Justice Reform: Juggling Between 
Politics and Perfection, 62 FoRDHAM L. REv. 833, 833 (1994) (analyzing CJRA and its 
requirement that every district court direct substantial resources towards reducing 
expense and delay in courts). 
27. See Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, The 
Geographical Boundaries of the Several Judicial Circuits: Recommendations for Change, 
reprinted in 62 F.R.D. 223, 229 (1973) [hereinafter Hruska Commission] (propos-
ing realignment of Fifth and Ninth Circuits). 
28. See Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807 (creating Com-
mission on Revision of Federal Court Appellate System); see also THOMAS E. BAKER, 
RATIONING JusncE ON APPEAL 31-51 (1994) [hereinafter BAKER, RATIONING Jus. 
TICE] (discussing crisis of volume); Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Bounda-
ries-Why the Proposal to Divide the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is 
Not Such a Good Idea, 22 ARiz. ST. LJ. 917, 925 (1990) [hereinafter Baker, Redrawing 
Circuit Boundaries] (examining Commission's creation and suggesting Warren Bur-
ger's role in creation). See generally Arthur D. Hellman, Legal Problems of Dividing a 
State Between Federal Judicial Circuits, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1188, 1191 (1974) (examin-
ing legal consequences of Commission's recommendations). 
29. See Act of Oct. 14, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994)) (dividing Fifth Circuit into two separate cir-
cuits); see also Hruska Commission, supra note 27, 62 F.R.D. at 230-34 (arguing for 
realignment of geographical boundaries of Fifth Circuit which, in 1973, had larg-
est volume of judicial business of any court of appeals). See generally H.R. REP. No. 
96-1390, at 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CA.N. 4236, 4236 (enacting legisla-
tion dividing Fifth Circuit into two circuits); DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. 
w ALKER, A COURT DIVIDED-THE FIITH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE Pou. 
TICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM 1 (1988) (detailing division of Fifth Circuit, composed of 
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mission's suggestion that the Ninth Circuit be split underlies peren-
nial calls for bifurcation, one as recently as May 1995.30 Over the 
last twenty years, the Commission's efforts have framed much de-
bate regarding the problems which expanding caseloads cause and 
the best means of treating those dockets.s1 
Warren Burger, in his unremitting pursuit of workable reforms 
that would facilitate the administration of justice, willingly con-
fronted and even actively engaged controversy. Perhaps the preem-
inent illustration was his fervent and frequent advocacy of an 
intermediate appellate court to relieve the Supreme Court's work-
load.32 The Chief Justice vigorously and persistently espoused the 
idea, although Congress never created the tribunal. During 1988, 
former Chief Justice Burger observed: "Apathy and inertia seem to 
surround proposals for improving the administration of justice un-
less there's a driving force behind them."S3 
Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi, and Eleventh Circuit, composed of Florida, Geor-
gia and Alabama). 
30. See Hruska Commission, supra note 27, 62 F.R.D. at 234-42 (advocating 
division of Ninth Circuit which, in 1973, handled more cases than any circuit ex-
cept "the beleaguered Fifth"); S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995) (establishing commis-
sion to study possible effects of Ninth Circuit division); S. 948, lOlst Cong. (1989) 
(proposing division of Ninth Circuit). For a general discussion of splitting the 
Ninth Circuit, see RESTRUCTURING JuSTICE: THE INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIR-
curr AND THE FuTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990); 
Kurland, supra note 16, at 1113; Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 
44 EMORY LJ. 1357 (1995). 
31. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice 
of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, lOlst Cong. (1990) (considering revision of title 
28 of United States Code to divide Ninth Circuit into two circuits); Baker, Redraw-
ing Circuit Boundaries, supra note 28, at 924-28 (same). See generally Tobias, supra 
note 30, at 1357 (same). 
32. See Reflections, supra note 6, at 7; Warren Weaver, Jr., Burger Supports Propo-
sal for a New National Court of Appeal,s, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1975, at 17 (noting that 
new court would double number of nationally applicable legal rulings by resolving 
disputes that Supreme Court lacked time to hear). See generally BURGER, supra note 
10, at 77-83 (reproducing speech titled "The Report of the Freund Study Group on 
the Caseload of the Supreme Court," American Law Institute, Washington, D.C., 
May 15, 1973) (blaming population growth, increasing complexity of modern busi-
ness and government, expansion of legislation protecting consumers and wide 
range of new legislation for Court's increasing workload); Thomas E. Baker & 
Douglas D. McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1400, 
1410 (1987) (referring to Chief Justice Burger's belief that intermediate appellate 
court is only solution to Court's excessive workload); Cannon, supra note 7, at 41 
(arguing that creation of intermediate appellate court would "allow the Supreme 
Court to focus on the cases most deserving its attention while ensuring national 
review for other cases warranting it"). 
33. Reflections, supra note 6, at 7. Warren Burger also actively participated in 
prison reform and supported numerous other initiatives that improved the admin-
istration of justice. See Cikins, supra note 7, at 8 (highlighting Chief Justice Bur-
ger's determination to strengthen criminal justice system and ensure punishment 
of wrongdoers, while also providing offenders opportunity to reform); Friedman, 
1996) BURGER AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 515 
Some observers asserted that Warren Burger's imperious de-
meanor complicated his efforts to build consensus on the Supreme 
Court.34 However, the Chief Justice apparently never forgot his 
Midwestern origins. Warren Burger was one of seven children who 
secured his first job at the age of ten delivering newspapers. He 
later attended night classes in undergraduate and law school while 
selling life insurance during the day.35 The Chief Justice similarly 
worked assiduously to guarantee that all of the courts functioned 
efficiently, thereby enhancing the quality of justice and protecting 
taxpayers. In 1973, he stated: "By making the judicial system more 
productive, we are making the federal courts accessible to all Amer-
icans at less personal financial expense and less emotional ex-
pense-all in addition to saving citizens' ta.xes."36 
The present appears to be an especially troubled time for the 
increasingly beleaguered federal courts. Many district courts expe-
rience greater difficulties in resolving a steadily growing, more com-
plex, civil docket37 and a substantial, albeit relatively static, criminal 
caseload, a situation that the 1994 crime legislation promises to ex-
acerbate. 38 Numerous federal judges considered the Civil Justice 
Reform Act of 1990 to be a congressional attempt at micro-manag-
ing the courts' internal operations and, therefore, an unwarranted 
supra note 16, at 14 (stating that Congress has passed number of needed adminis-
trative reforms suggested or endorsed by Chief Justice Burger). 
34. See, e.g., Matthew Brelis, Court Improvements, Not Ideowgy, Calf.ed Burger's 
Main Legacy, BosTON GLOBE, June 26, 1995, at l; Hutchison, supra note 6, at A20. 
35. Hutchinson, supra note 6, at A20 (describing Chief Justice Burger as "a 
rags-to-riches story" who won scholarship to Princeton but stayed home to help 
family and save money); see al,so Reske, supra note 1, at 37 (detailing Chief Justice 
Burger's educational and career background). 
36. Imprint, supra note 7, at 4. 
37. See 1994 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE u .s. 
COURTS, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, app. 1, at 51-53 (1994) [here-
inafter AO ANNUAL REPORT]. See generally Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatury 
Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494, 495 (1986) (recognizing claim that 
federal courts are in "crisis"); Tobias, supra note 30, at 1404 (discussing various 
proposals to increase in workloads). 
38. See AO ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 37, app. l, at 42-44; see al,so Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 
1796 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-14223 (1994)) (creating new legislation to 
combat crime). But see Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-132, llO Stat. 1214 (purportedly stopping abuse of federal collat-
eral remedies by limiting applications for habeas corpus). The second and fourth 
tenets of the CONTRACT WITH AMERICA promised to expand federal criminal juris-
diction. See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BoLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, 
REP. DICK ARMEY AND THE HousE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION (Ed Gilles-
pie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994). See generally William P. Marshall, Federalization: A 
Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 719, 720 (1995) (voicing concerns over recent 
enactment of federal crime legislation); Tobias, supra note 30, at 1404. 
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intrusion by a coordinate branch of government.39 The statute's 
implementation has further fragmented the already balkanized sys-
tem of federal civil procedure.40 
The Supreme Court's 1993 promulgation of an amendment 
prescribing automatic disclosure, which empowers all ninety-four 
federal districts to vary or to eschew the revision, has further under-
mined the national, uniform character of this procedural scheme.41 
The disclosure amendment's adoption has correspondingly eroded 
the authority and prestige of the national rule revision entities, 
such as the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Civil 
Rules, while dealing a deleterious symbolic and actual blow to the 
national rule amendment process.42 Had Senators and Representa-
39. See Tobias, supra note 22, at 1601 (detailing controversy surrounding im-
plementation of CJRA). See generally Johnston, supra note 26, at 843 (stating most 
significant restriction on judicial discretion is requirement that courts contemplate 
adoption of judicial management methods set forth in CJRA). But see Joseph R. 
Biden, Jr., Congress and the Courts: Our Mutual Obligation, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1285, 
1285-87 (1994) (describing crucial role of CJRA in enabling Congress to help con-
trol federal caseload). 
40. See, e.g., Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil justice Re/arm Act of 
1990, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1447, 1447 (1994) (cautioning that goal of uniformity un-
derlying Federal Rules should not be compromised lightly); Carl Tobias, Civil jus-
tice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARiz. ST. LJ. 1393, 1393 
(1992) (arguing that thirty-four federal courts' implementation of CJRA threatens 
continued viability of uniform, simple system of procedure). See generally Linda S. 
Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural justice, 77 MINN. L. R.Ev. 375, 380-81 
(1992) (stating that "[t]he Civil Justice Reform Act is at war with the concept of 
uniform procedural rules"). For a further discussion of the fragmentation of fed-
eral civil procedure, see supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
41. See, e.g., Lauren K. Robel, Mandatory Discl.osure and Local Abrogation: In 
Search of a Theory for optional Rules, 14 REv. Lmc. 49, 49 (1994) (finding "startling 
the explicit rejection of the uniformity principle in the text of a civil rule regulat-
ing lawyers' work"); Tobias, supra note 22, at 1611-17 (noting that "conflicting pro-
cedures complicate[] federal civil litigation for lawyers and litigants, especially for 
goverment and public interest attorneys who litigate in multiple districts, and it 
tested judges' and practitioners' tolerance for inconsistency"). See a/,so FED. R. CIV. 
P. 26(a) (requiring mandatory disclosure, "[e]xcept, to the extent otherwise stipu-
lated or directed by order or local rule"), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 431-32 (1993). 
For a discussion of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see supra note 22 
and accompanying text. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The 
Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemak-
ing, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1393, 1393 (1994) (concluding that reform of civil discovery 
has created balkanization and confusion in civil justice system); Carl Tobias, The 
Transmittal Letter Translated, 46 FLA. L. R.Ev. 127, 129 (1994) (describing 1983 revi-
sion of Rule 11 as "most controversial revision of the civil rules ever 
promulgated"). 
42. See, e.g., Robel, supra note 41, at 51, 61 (suggesting Advisory Committee 
lacks commitment to fundamental aims of procedural system); Carl Tobias, Death 
Knell for National Rule Revision: Hearings on H.R. 988 (1995) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experi-
ence: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. R.Ev. 795, 
795 (1991) (suggesting that adoption of disclosure amendment signals decline of 
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tives passed a legal reform in the Contract With America that would 
have significantly revised Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 only 
two years after the Supreme Court fundamentally amended the pro-
vision, Congress would have additionally undercut the power and 
respect which the rule revisors have traditionally enjoyed and may 
well have eviscerated the national amendment process.43 
Burgeoning appellate court dockets impose increasingly oner-
ous duties on circuit court judges, complicating their efforts to de-
cide appeals expeditiously, inexpensively and fairly and 
compromising the appellate ideal.44 Moreover, federal courts ex-
perts have discovered no efficacious means of treating the difficul-
ties that these mounting circuit caseloads create.45 
Despite the growing number and severity of problems which 
the federal courts face, Congress persistently requires that they 
achieve more with fewer resources.46 Symptomatic is the continu-
Advisory Committee's role as procedural rule-drafting body); Charles Alan Wright, 
Foreword: The Malaise of Federal Rulemaking, 14 REv. LmG. 1, 8 (1994) (describing 
deterioration of national rulemaking process). 
43. See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, supra note 38; H.R. 988, 104th Cong. ( 1995) 
(proposing to amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11); Carl Tobias, Comman 
Sense and Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REv. 699, 723-24, 734-37 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Tobias, Comman Sense] ("Passage of the legislation would ... extend the unwise, 
disruptive practice of Congressional intervention in the rule revision process."). 
See generally Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. LJ. 171, 171 
(1994) (examining process of revising Federal Rule 11). For a further discussion 
of the erosion of the Advisory Committee's rulemaking authority, see supra note 42 
and accompanying text. 
44. See BAKER, RATIONING JusTICE, supra note 28, at 33 (describing sense of 
crisis in federal appellate courts); Report of Subcommittee on Administration, Manage-
ment, and Structure, 2 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 109 (1990) (stating that 
yearly caseload of average court of appeals judge has nearly tripled in past three 
decades); see also AO ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 37, app. 1, at 2 (showing that 
filings in regional courts of appeals declined slightly in 1994 for first time since 
1978). See generally Tobias, supra note 30, at 1395 (assessing growing caseload in 
federal courts). 
45. See BAKER, RATIONING JusTICE, supra note 28, at 295-96 (describing inabil-
ity of Federal Courts Study Committee to proffer meaningful structural reform of 
appellate court system); Tobias, supra note 30, at 1395 (noting "a lack of consensus 
among federal court experts about precisely what difficulties growing dockets 
cause"). For a further discussion of the crisis of expanding caseloads, see supra 
notes 27-31 and accompanying text. 
46. This constitutes a constant refrain in the annual end of the year reports 
on the state of the federal judiciary compiled by Chief Justice William H. Rehn-
quist. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, 1995 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 
(1995) (predicting that fiscal austerity will demand closer attention to how effi-
ciently judicial machinery operates), reprinted in 19 AM. J. TRIAL Aovoc. 491, 495-
501 (1996); William H. Rehnquist, 1994 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 
(1994) (recognizing "need to allocate resources rationally in the face of fiscal aus-
terity and rising caseloads"), reprinted in 27 THE THIRD BRANCH (Fed.Judicial Ctr., 
Wash., D.C.),Jan. 1995, at l; see also President Signs FY 94 Appropriation Bill For Judici-
ary, 25 THE THIRD BRANCH (Fed.Judicial Ctr., Wash., D.C.), Nov. 1993, at 1 (stating 
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ing legislative expansion of civil and criminal jurisdiction without 
concomitant appropriations to accommodate the increasing, more 
complex, civil docket and the large, if rather stable, criminal 
caseload.47 
During these difficult times for the federal courts, individuals 
in the federal government's three branches, who are responsible 
for the federal civil and criminal systems, should honor Warren 
Burger by rededicating themselves to improving the administration 
of justice, an ideal which the Chief Justice so successfully pursued. 
On a comparatively general, theoretical plane, these public servants 
might continue applying former Chief Judge Clifford Wallace's in-
sightful suggestion to the polycentric conundrum posed by federal 
court jurisdiction, expanding appellate dockets, and dwindling re-
sources, including the judiciary's size.48 Judge Wallace recom-
mended that a three-branch convocation be convened to explore 
"new federal law and its impact on the federal court system."49 A 
that funding level for fiscal year 1994 is more than $400 million short of amount 
necessary for full funding of all court programs). See generally William H. Rehn-
quist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, 1993 Wis. L. REv. l, 3 
(arguing that resources are inadequate to meet "ever-increasing demands of the 
criminal justice system and a litigious citizenry"). For a further discussion of the 
increasing demands placed on the judicial system, see infra note 52 and accompa-
nying text. 
47. In fairness, certain legal reforms included in the ninth tenet of the CON-
TRACT WITH AMERICA are intended to address some problems, such as litigation 
abuse, which the federal courts confront. See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, supra note 
38; Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 
737 (purportedly limiting abusive securities litigation); H.R. 988, 104th Cong. 
(1995) (reforming federal civil justice system). See generally Tobias, Common Sense, 
supra note 43, at 701 (arguing that 1994 Common Sense Legal Reforms would 
impose greater expense and delay in civil litigation). Additionally, implementing 
these reforms would create other difficulties-inappropriately restricting federal 
court access, undermining the authority and prestige of the national rule revision 
entities, and eroding the national amendment process. Id. at 723 (predicting that 
legislation will have devastating impact on national rule revision process). For a 
further discussion of proposed legislation's effect on the rule amendment process, 
see supra note 43 and accompanying text. Moreover, the second and fourth tenets 
of the CONTRACT WITH AMERICA promise to expand federal criminal jurisdiction. 
See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, supra note 38, at 9 (proposing anti-crime package). 
For a further discussion of legislation's potential effect on federal criminal 
caseload, see supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
48. See Letter fromJ. Clifford Wallace, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Attorney General Janet 
Reno, then-Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Joseph Biden, and then-House Judi-
ciary Committee Chair Jack Brooks (Mar. 29, 1993) (suggesting three-branch con-
ference to study federalization), reprinted in Marshall, supra note 38, at 738-45 
[hereinafter Wallace Letter]; see also Lon L. Fuller, The Forms. and Limits of Adjudica-
tion, 92 HAR.v. L. REv. 353, 394-404 (1978) (discussing polycentricity). 
49. See Wallace Letter, supra note 48, at 742 (advocating convocation as op-
portunity to address problem of federal court docket control triggered by un-
checked federalization). There have recently been several convocations. 
1996] BURGER AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 519 
relatively specific, practical illustration would be the imposition of a 
moratorium on federal civil rule revision, pending the conclusion 
of Civil Justice Reform Act experimentation, its thorough, expert 
evaluation and congressional resolution of the legislation's future. 50 
Indeed, "now more than ever,"51 as the nation approaches the 
twenty-first century, there is a compelling need to derive inspiration 
from the example of Warren Burger. The Chief Justice's "unprece-
dented and unflagging efforts to improve the legal system have left 
an unmatched legacy of efficient administration in the Federal Judi-
ciary despite the constant growth in demand placed on the judicial 
system."52 
Telephone Interview with Mark Mendenhall, Assistant Circuit Executive, United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
50. See Tobias, Common Sense, supra note 43, at 736 ("Awaiting the conclusion 
of the CJRA initiative could afford the concomitant benefit of rectifying or amelio-
rating the problems created by local procedural proliferation."); Stephen B. Bur-
bank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Ref arm: A Call For a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. 
REv. 841, 842 (1993) (calling for moratorium on procedural law reform until such 
time as rulemakers have addressed issues of alternative reform strategies and their 
likely impacts); see also Tobias, supra note 22, at 1627-34 (suggesting ways to revise 
procedures that govern civil litigation). For a further discussion of Civil Justice 
Reform Act of 1990, see supra notes 26, 39-40 and accompanying text. 
51. This phrase was President Nixon's re-election slogan in the 1972 Presiden-
tial Campaign. 
52. Imprint, supra note 7, at 4 (reproducing Judicial Conference resolution 
praising Chief Justice Burger on occasion of his retirement). 
